how G. E. Moore cannot overcome skepticism - The Gemsbok (2023)

Introduction:

Although there are several voices that shine as philosophers of philosophical skepticism, it is a subject that has attracted the attention of a large number of philosophers over time. The so-called challenge of radical skepticism has been raised several times and allegedly overcome. One of the notable voices mentioned in the last century was G.E. Moore, who championed what he and others have termed "common sense" in response to radical skepticism (where radical skepticism refers to the position that knowledge - or indeed knowledge of the outside world - is impossible).

Formally, Moore's answer is based on what is now called in certain contextsa Moorish change- change onemake moodsecond premise of the argument to create aremoving the methodArgument that has an opposite conclusion - to support what is now called the Moorean fact in certain contexts. These types of arguments are explained below. And this naming scheme (i.e. Moorean change, Moorean fact) should tell you how influential these ideas were. GE Moore was an able and insightful philosopher, and his work on skepticism was an inspiration to Ludwig Wittgenstein (who later attempted to provide a rigorous account of Moore's approachNotes collected in a book after Wittgenstein's death🇧🇷 Now I will point out why G.E. Moore's assertive argument falls short of the challenge of radical skepticism.

An Argument for Radical Skepticism, and G.E. Moore's answer:

The argument that Moore faces is an epistemological argument that takes roughly the following form (the text of these premises and conclusions being extrapolated from Moore's argument, as it appears, for examplehis essay "A Defense of Common Sense"):

(1) If ITut noI know with absolute certainty that my sensory experience accurately reflects reality, so I dodo not do itthey know that an external reality exists.

(2) EUdo not do itknowing with absolute certainty that my sensory experience accurately represents reality.

(3) Daher Ido not do itthey know that an external reality exists.

That is amake moodargument, meaning that it has the following deductively valid form: If A, then B; ONE; Therefore, B. Moore restructures the argument as follows:

(1) If Ido not do itI know with absolute certainty that my sensory experience accurately reflects reality, so I dodo not do itthey know that an external reality exists.

(2') EUTutthey know that an external reality exists.

(3′) Daher ITutknowing with absolute certainty that my sensory experience accurately represents reality.

That is aremoving the methodargument, meaning that it has the following deductively valid form: If A, then B; Do not be; therefore not-A. The core of G.E. Moore's contention that this solves the challenge of radical skepticism is that he believes (2') is intuitively more likely than (2). This is not only verifiable, but also appeals to common sense.

Two weaknesses of this Moorian shift:

The first weakness of Moore's answer that I'm going to discuss should be easy for you to notice. Moore sometimes gave three criteria for good evidence (egyour essay"evidence of an outside world"🇧🇷 He believes his second premise can be demonstrated, for example, by observing his own members ("Here's a hand," Moore explains lightly). But the premise is that heYou knowthat members exist, andthis knowledgeit is undetectable.

Not knowing if they lack knowledge is not a problem for the skeptic. It is precisely this fact that justifies their skepticism. But thatit isa problem for someone tryingStudyof knowing that his supposed proof rests solely on a knowledge claim that is itself unproven (perhaps unprovable). In fact, the fallibility of (2') renders Moore's argument unfounded.

So Moore's overall project amounts to an appeal to his own intuition when it comes to the fact that one premise intuitively seems more likely to him than another. While an appeal to intuition is useful for clarifying and organizing thoughts, it is not proof. And it is precisely the justification and fallibility of the assertions in question that are examined. Because if G.E. Moore's argument really amounts to a claim that masks afallilistconcept of knowledge, then he could just as well say:"Although I do not know that an external reality exists, I happen to know that an external reality exists."

And that reveals a second weakness in Moore's response: his base may support his own opposition. Finally, the above weakness regarding non-repudiation only applies if youTuthave exactly the same intuition as G.E. Moore, which is unlikelyatdoes (and certainly which is highly unlikely that any philosopher familiar with all the relevant premises will do). One person's Moorean facts may be another person's unintuitive assumptions, and Moore's own defense of intuition would then form the basis of radical skepticism for any individual considering any of several academically skeptical scenarios that hold (2) more likely than his negation .

Conclusion:

So if Moore, like so many others, failed to overcome and finally resolve the challenge of radical skepticism, how can I overcome it? Well, in a perhaps unsatisfactory if characteristic way, I don't. It might be more accurate to say that I ignore it, or I see it as pragmatically irrelevant. One of the main strengths of my loyalty to phenomenology, the strength of which I pragmatically cling to and which I have praised elsewhere in the discussionMoralefree willis that by definition it is the study of phenomena and not the study of a reality without perspective. I consider statements about the outside world to be equivalent to statements aboutRoger thatReality and Objects of Consciousness.

The real strength of my pragmatic and phenomenological attitude is its opposition to unsubstantiated claims and unnecessary claims, even to radical skepticism. Note that when the two opposing positions have identical implications for beliefs and practices, it also detracts from passionate and undignified arguments about trifles. And I never accept my own intuition as oneStudyOf something. There is a faint distinction that could (and should) still be made, according to Kantian principles, between "external reality" as referring to perceived epistemic reality, and "external reality" as referring to the real reality underlying all perception ). But a more detailed discussion of that is a topic for another day. The only important thing is that the perceived reality is good enough for me. Despite all this, I have no more trouble than G.E. Moore, if you're talking about my experiences with external reality, and neither should you.

[Subjects:Epistemology, Moorean Change, Skepticism]All-Alone Intuition:

Ing. Moore's tantalizing but inadequate response to radical skepticism